# Customer Training Workshop Traveo™ II Boot







### **Target Products**

### > Target product list for this training material

Family Category	Series	Code Flash Memory Size
Traveo™ II Automotive Body Controller Entry	CYT2B6	Up to 576 KB
Traveo II Automotive Body Controller Entry	CYT2B7	Up to 1088 KB
Traveo II Automotive Body Controller Entry	CYT2B9	Up to 2112 KB
Traveo II Automotive Body Controller Entry	CYT2BL	Up to 4160 KB
Traveo II Automotive Body Controller High	CYT3BB/CYT4BB	Up to 4160 KB
Traveo II Automotive Body Controller High	CYT4BF	Up to 8384 KB
Traveo II Automotive Cluster	CYT3DL	Up to 4160 KB
Traveo II Automotive Cluster	CYT4DN	Up to 6336 KB



### Introduction to Traveo II Body Controller Entry





### Introduction to Traveo II Body Controller High

### > Boot is part of the CPU subsystem



### Review TRM chapters 11 and 38 for additional

details

**Hint Bar** 

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### Features

- Traveo II has ROM and Flash boot
- After reset, CM0+ starts executing from the ROM boot
- CM4/CM7 are deactivated until the boot process is completed \_
- The user application runs on CM0+ after boot

**ROM Boot** 

- CM4/CM7 are activated by the CM0+ user application
- Supports secure boot
- Enables protection setting (configuration of MPU, SMPU, PPU, and — SWPU)
- Enables DAP access
- Enables system calls

Reset

User Application

Flash Boot



Review the BootROM and Flash Boot TRM chapters for additional details
Review the datasheet for ROM and Flash boot time
Arm <sup>®</sup> Cortex <sup>®</sup> -M0+ (CM0+)
Arm Cortex-M4 (CM4)
Arm Cortex-M7 (CM7)
Memory protection unit (MPU)
Shared memory protection unit (SMPU)
Peripheral protection unit (PPU)
Software protection unit (SWPU)
Debug access port (DAP)

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### **ROM Boot**

### > Operation

- (A) Verifies the secure boot with eFuse information
- (B) Validates the Flash boot code and SFlash objects with eFuse information
- (C) Applies the appropriate protection state

State	Description
NORMAL	Lifecycle stage is NORMAL_PROVISIONED
SECURE	Lifecycle stage is SECURE or SECURE_WITH_DEBUG
DEAD	Detects corruption/error

- (D) Configures the protection unit (MPU, SMPU, PPU, and SWPU)
- (E) Goes to the next process
- If the validation passes, MCU will jump to Flash boot
- If the validation fails, the following will be set, and MCU will be in idle state
  - Enables system calls
  - Sets PC for all masters
  - Enables DAP access

### **Hint Bar Review the BootROM TRM** chapter for additional details Supervisory Flash (SFlash) For details of (A) to (E), see the next slide

### **ROM Boot Flow**





<sup>1</sup> Table of contents (TOC): The TOC is divided into a Part1 object (TOC1) set at the factory and a Part2 object (TOC2) set by the user

- TOC1: This is an object for device protection setting

- TOC2: This is an object for the digital signature scheme

(A) Validates the TOC2 and secures image application<sup>1</sup> in Flash

This happens only when the protection state is SECURE

If the validation passes, MCU will proceed to the next step

This happens only when the protection state is NORMAL

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If the validation fails, MCU will be in idle state

(B) If necessary, MCU will jump to the bootloader

(F) Launches the CM0+ and CM4/CM7 applications

(C) Enables the system calls

(E) Sets the PC for all masters

### Flash Boot

Operation

## Hint Bar Review the Flash Boot TRM chapter for additional details For details of (A) to (E), see the next slide (D) Configures the protection units (MPU, SMPU, PPU, and SWPU) This happens only when the protection state is NORMAL or SECURE

### Flash Boot Flow





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### CAN Bus LIN Bus Download Application Code Traveo II **Bootloader Activation Conditions**

- The internal bootloader will activate if all these conditions are met:
  - Two words at the start of flash must be 0xFFFF FFFF

The bootloader is part of the Flash boot code

or LIN interface and stores it in the RAM

TOC2 is valid and TOC2\_FLAGS bit FB\_BOOTLOADER\_DISABLE should be 2'b01 (default). Otherwise, TOC2 is erased

The bootloader downloads the user application (Flash Loader) through the CAN

- Protection mode is not SECURE or SECURE\_DEAD
- No debugger connection occurs during a 1-second wait window

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Overview



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**Review the Flash Boot** TRM chapter for additional

details



- Use Case
  - Traveo II can update the user application while preventing unauthorized access to the network and data tampering using the Hardware Security Module (HSM)
    - Rollback by Dual Bank Flash: If a new application encounters a critical error, you can roll back to the previous running application



**Hint Bar Review the Flash Boot** TRM chapter for additional details

<sup>2</sup> TLS



### Secure Boot

- Guarantees that only the intended firmware runs on the system
- > Operation
  - The ROM boot validates Flash boot code, TOC, and PUBLIC\_KEY
  - The Flash boot validates the secure image application
  - The secure image application validates user application for CM4/CM7



<sup>1</sup> For RSA 2K/3K/4K support, see the device-specific datasheet (under the section Part Number/Ordering Code Nomenclature, Hardware option)



### Secure System Hex File

Hint Bar The secure system hex file contains several objects and not just the > user's code **Review the Flash Boot** Hex File Who stores the objects: TRM chapter for additional Lifecycle Stages ► NORMAL fuse: Cypress, SECURE fuse: User details FACTORY HASH ➤ Cypress For details, see the SECURE HASH User/Third party Appendix SECURE HASH ZEROES User/Third party (eFuse) User/Third party PUBLIC KEY TOC1 → Cypress TOC2 User Flash Boot Code → Cypress (SFlash) Secure Image Code User **Digital Signature** User Secure Image Block The following colors indicate where User Application Code User objects are stored. **Digital Signature** User SFlash objects **User Application Block** Flash objects (Flash) eFuse objects





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	Names	Bits	Description	Boview the Reat POM and
SECURE	AP_CTL_CM0_DISABLE	1:0	Indicates that this device does not allow access to the CM0+ access port	Flash Boot TRM chapters
Access Restrictions	AP_CTL_CM4_DISABLE <sup>1</sup>	3:2	Indicates that this device does not allow access to the CM4 access port	for additional details
	AP_CTL_SYS_DISABLE	5:4	Indicates that this device does not allow access to the system access port	
	SYS_AP_MPU_ENABLE	6	Indicates that the MPU on the system access port must be programmed and locked according to the settings in the next six fields	
	DIRECT_EXECUTE_DISABLE	7	Disables DirectExecute system call functionality (implemented in software)	
	FLASH_ALLOWED	10:8	Indicates what portion of main flash is accessible through the system access port. Only a portion of flash starting at the bottom of the area is exposed	
	SRAM_ALLOWED	13:11	Indicates what portion of SRAM is accessible through the system access port. Only a portion of SRAM starting at the bottom of the area is exposed. Encoding is the same as FLASH_ALLOWED	
	WORK_FLASH_ALLOWED	15:14	Indicates what portion of work flash is accessible through the system access port. Only a portion of work flash starting at the bottom of the area is exposed	
	SFLASH_ALLOWED	17:16	Indicates what portion of supervisory flash is accessible through the system access port. Only a portion of supervisory flash starting at the bottom of the area is exposed	
	MMIO_ALLOWED	19:18	Indicates what portion of the MMIO region is accessible through the system access port	

<sup>1</sup> It applies to products on which CM4 is implemented.



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	Names	Bits	Description	Paviow the PootPOM and
SECURE Access Restrictions	SMIF_XIP_ENABLE	20	Indicates what portion of SMIF_XIP is accessible through the system access port	Flash Boot TRM chapters for additional details
DEAD Access Restrictions	<same as<br="">SECURE Access Restrictions&gt;</same>		The structure is identical to the one above but used when entering DEAD mode. It assumes that this structure is more restrictive than SECURE	
Critical Object	FACTORY_HASH		SHA-256 (upper 128 bits) that covers objects in TOC1. It is checked before transitioning to SECURE_WITH_DEBUG or SECURE	
Hash	SECURE_HASH		SHA-256 that covers the Flash boot image and other objects in TOC1 and TOC2. Flash boot code is not started unless this value is correct	
	SECURE_HASH_ZEROES		The number of bits that are '0' (fuses that are not blown) in the SHA-256. This guarantees that when a HASH is programmed, it cannot be changed into another valid HASH value	



### Definition of PUBLIC KEY in SFlash

Hint Bar The diagram shows the key object structure used for signature verification **Review the Flash Boot** TRM chapter for additional K3, up to 4096 bits details RSA<sup>1</sup> public key K2, up to 4096 bits optional data K1, up to 4096+1 bits<sup>2</sup> Exponent, up to 256 bits RSA<sup>1</sup> public key mandatory data Modulus, up to 4096 bits Pointer to K3, or NULL Pointer to K2, or NULL Public key object Pointer to K1, or NULL Public key Length in bits of Exponent structure Pointer to Exponent Length in bits of Modulus Pointer to Modulus Signature Scheme **Object Size** 

<sup>1</sup> For RSA 2K/3K/4K support, see the device-specific datasheet (under the section Part Number/Ordering Code Nomenclature, Hardware option). <sup>2</sup> Modulus, Exponent, K1, K2, and K3 must be 32-bit aligned; the data is little endian.



		Hint Bar
Public Key Object Member Name	Description	Review the Flash Boot TRM chapter for additional details
Object Size	A size in bytes used in SECURE_HASH calculation for public key data protection	
Signature Scheme	A signature scheme 0 - RSASSA-PKCS1-v1.5 with RSA up to 4096 and SHA-256 (other values are reserved)	
Pointer to Modulus	A pointer to an RSA public key modulus data	
Length in bits of Modulus	A length in bits of an RSA public key modulus	
Pointer to Exponent	A pointer to an RSA public key exponent data	
Length in bits of Exponent	A length in bits of an RSA public key exponent data	
Pointer to K1	A pointer to an optional RSA public key coefficient, named Barrett coefficient	
Pointer to K2	A pointer to an optional RSA public key coefficient, named inverse modulus	
Pointer to K3	A pointer to an optional RSA public key coefficient, named rBarr coefficient	



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	Names	Description	Baujaw the BeetBOM and
	FUSE_WRITE_PU	Data structure of FUSE_WRITE_PU	Flash Boot TRM chapters
 FUSE_WRITE_PU (16B)	N_FUSE_WRITE_PU	Number of FUSE_WRITE_PUs stored in this object. It is followed by the contents of FUSE WRITE PUs	for additional details
N_FUSE_WRITE_PU (4B)	FUSE_READ_PU	Data structure of FUSE_READ_PU	
 FUSE_READ_PU (16B)	N_FUSE_READ_PU	Number of FUSE_READ_PUs stored in this object. It is followed by the contents of FUSE_READ_RUS	
N_FUSE_READ_PU (4B)	FLASH WRITE PU	Data structure of FLASH_WRITE_PU	
 FLASH_WRITE_PU (16B)	N_FLASH_WRITE_PU	Number of FLASH_WRITE_PUs stored in this object. It is followed by the contents of FLASH_WRITE_PUs	
N_FLASH_WKITE_FU (4B)	PPU_ID, PPU	PPU_ID is the PPU number (2 bytes) and PPU Config is	
PPU Config. (1B)	Config defines a PPU	Read class)	
N_PPU (4B)	N_PPU	Number of PPU structures stored in this object	
	SMPU15	Contains SMPU region address and SMPU region attributes	
SMPU15 (16B)	N_SMPU	Number of SMPU structures (starting form SMPU15) stored in this object	
Object Size (4B)	Object Size	Size of boot protection object in bytes	



### Definition of TOC2 in SFlash

) T(	OC2 is stored in SFlash and is	s used to configure Flash boot and ROM boot firmware	Hint Bar
Offset	Names	Purpose	Review the Flash Boot
0x00	TOC2_OBJECT_SIZE	Object size in bytes starting from offset 0x00 until the last entry in TOC2	details
0x04	TOC2_MAGIC_NUMBER	Magic number (0x01211220)	
0x08	TOC2_SMIF_CFG_STRUCT_ADDR	Null terminated table of pointers representing the SMIF configuration structure	
0x0C	TOC2_FIRST_USER_APP_ADDR	Address of CM0+ first user application object (such as HSM in Traveo II)	
0x10	TOC2_FIRST_USER_APP_FORMAT	First application object format	
0x14	TOC2_SECOND_USER_APP_ADDR	Address of CM0+ second user application object (0's if none)	
0x18	TOC2_SECOND_USER_APP_FORMAT	Second application object format	
0x1C	TOC2_FIRST_CM4_0_USER_APP_ADDR	Address of CM4 core0 first user application object	
0x20	TOC2_SECOND_CM4_0_USER_APP_ADDR	Address of CM4 core0 second user application object	
0x24	TOC2_FIRST_CM4_1_USER_APP_ADDR	Address of CM4 core1 first user application object	
0x28	TOC2_SECOND_CM4_1_USER_APP_ADDR	Address of CM4 core1 second user application object	
0x100	TOC2_SHASH_OBJECTS	Number of additional objects (not including objects for FACTORY_HASH) starting from offset 0x104 to be verified for SECURE_HASH	
0x104	TOC2_SIGNATURE_VERIF_KEY	Address of signature verification key (0 if none). The object is signature scheme specific. It is the public key in case of RSA	
0x108	TOC2_APP_PROTECTION_ADDR	Address of user SWPU object stored in SFlash	
0x1F8	TOC2_FLAGS	TOC2 configuration. If TOC2 is erased, Flash boot assumes TOC2_FLAGS = 0x0000_0242	

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Definition of Application Block in Code Flash

## All core applications are encapsulated based on the following standard application formats

- Cypress Basic Application Format (CyBAF)
  - Used in VIRGIN and NORMAL protection modes



**Digital Signature** 

- Used in SECURE protection mode

Footer

1		Unused or Padding
	CMx Code	Core[N-1] Code and Data
	Segment	Core[N-1] Vector Table
		Alignment Padding
	CM0+ Code	Core[0] Code and Data
	Segment	Core[0] Vector Table
Object		Alignment Padding
Size		Customer Data
	Header	Core(N-1) CPU ID/Type
		Core0 CPU ID/Type
		Core [N-1] VT Offset
		Core [0] VT Offset
		Number of Cores (N)
		Attributes
		App ID Word
Ļ		Object Size
		-

Review the Flash Boot TRM chapter for additional details

**Hint Bar** 





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### **Revision History**

Revision	ECN	Submission Data	Description of Change
**	6123648	04/06/2018	Initial release
*A	6323653	08/01/2018	Added page 2 Updated pages 3, 4, and 5
*В	6702818	10/16/2019	Updated page 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 9, 10, 14, 22 Delete CYT2B5 series Added page 5
*C	6659762	01/06/2020	Minor Change: Corrected revision in page 23, it reflects *A instead of *B in previous revision.
*D	6815787	02/10/2020	Page 7: Updated the protection table, 11 (merged with 12) Added page 12 Updated pages 3 to 21 (Minor changes)
*E	7048389	12/19/2020	Updated pages 2, 3, 4, 5.
*F	7098118	02/24/2021	Updated the RSA support size (pages 13, 18, 19)