

Secure Firmware Over-The-Air (FOTA) Update in Traveo II

About this document

Scope and purpose

AN229058 explains the different steps involved in developing a secure and reliable Firmware Over-The-Air (FOTA) update in Traveo™ II MCU. Note that this document does not explain the setting up of a wireless interface to perform an update over the air, rather explains how a logical flash bank in the Traveo II MCU can be updated with the new image and how reliably (using Traveo II MCU's Secure Boot Mechanisms) the boot code can jump to the new image if successfully authenticated.

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Introduction

1 Introduction

This application note describes how FOTA (Firmware Over-The-Air) updates can be securely performed in Cypress Traveo™ II MCUs. The series includes Arm® Cortex®-M CPUs with enhanced secure hardware extension (eSHE) or Hardware Security Module (HSM), CAN FD, memory, and analog and digital peripheral functions in a single chip.

In the Automotive embedded systems, FOTA update is a remote software management technology that helps to perform wireless firmware upgrade on the device. Upgrading the device firmware once it is on the field might be essential especially when the system demands critical bug fixes, addition of a new feature, removal of an existing feature, and so on.

The complete implementation of FOTA is highly dependent on the device architecture (here Traveo II device). Traveo II MCU's internal Code Flash architecture supports Dual Bank Modes, which are mainly targeted for FOTA applications. This architecture ensures that the existing application is uninterrupted while a FOTA update happens and the new application is launched securely. The FOTA update should also mandate a roll-back mechanism to the old firmware if the new update is corrupted or interrupted for any reason.

This application note mainly focuses on the development of a Dual Bank Manager code, which helps you to check the validity of the new application image (using Cryptographic authentication functions) and then ensure that the validated image is launched by correctly modifying the Flash Bank and Remap registers.

Note that this is an advanced application note. See the following application notes before proceeding:

- [AN220242 - Flash Rewriting Procedure for Traveo II Family](#)
- [AN228680 - Secure System Configuration in Traveo II Family](#)

Introduction to FOTA

2 Introduction to FOTA

Figure 1 illustrates a typical example for a FOTA system in the automotive network.




Figure 1 Typical FOTA System

The master Electronic Control Unit (ECU) communicates with the Cloud to receive the new image. It can then implement a Gateway (based on CAN-FD for example) to update the images of the other Traveo II subsystems like the HVAC system and the Body Control Module. This communication can also be made secured using Crypto encryption and decryption and by using Protection Units (for example, Software Protection Units (SWPUs)), which allows only those ECUs with privileges for Flash Writes to perform flash upgrades.

Traveo II device supports True FOTA. This means that the:

- Update of the software image happens in the background. There is no interruption of application service.
- Update can be rolled back if there is a failure or as needed by the application.

This True FOTA is possible with Traveo II device as it supports:

- Dual bank Flash
- Read-while-write memory, allowing execution of software (read) while programming (write)
- Multiple levels of security and secure boot

2.1 Challenges with Conventional FOTA (without Secure Boot)

Figure 2 shows the Code Flash memory mapping for an 8-MB memory in Traveo II device.

Introduction to FOTA




Figure 2 Code Flash Memory Mapping for 8-MB Code Flash

FOTA architecture uses Dual Bank Mode. If there is a power failure or any other hardware issues during the FOTA upgrade, Traveo II device might enter a corrupted state. For instance, if there is a FOTA request while the application is executing code in Mapping B, the new image must be written to Logical Flash Bank 0. Now, if there is a power failure or corruption while the first few sectors were getting updated, Traveo II device could enter into a lock-up or corrupted state after the next reset because Flash boot always executes in Single Bank mode and by default jumps to the address specified by the Address of First User Application Object (that has the vector table, which is now corrupted) in TOC2 (see section 8.6). Implementing a secure boot mechanism based on the techniques discussed in this application note will help mitigate this issue.

Bank Switching Mechanism in Traveo II

3 Bank Switching Mechanism in Traveo II

In Traveo II family MCUs, OTA functionality is handled by two separate bits in the FLASHC_FLASH_CTL register. The MAIN_BANK_MODE bit is used to configure flash bank mode between Single and Dual Banks. MAIN_MAP bit is used to configure flash region between Mapping A and Mapping B. Both these bits are cleared by reset. ROM boot and Flash boot do not touch these configurations. In other words, Traveo II family MCU always boots up in Single Bank mode before the Arm Cortex-M0+ program starts. The application needs to configure dual bank and remap function as required.

Note: The MAIN_BANK_MODE bit is part of the FLASHC_FLASH_CTL register. Dual Bank mode is enabled if FLASHC_FLASH_CTL.MAIN_BANK_MODE = 1.

Note: The MAIN_MAP bit is also part of the FLASHC_FLASH_CTL register. Mapping A is used if this bit is “0” and Mapping B is used if this bit is “1”.

For more details on FLASHC_FLASH_CTL register, see the Registers Technical Reference Manual (TRM).

Note that the Dual Bank Manager software which is intensively discussed in the application note configures the Bank Mode and Mapping registers based on certain criteria. This Dual Bank Manager software is programmed to the user SFlash memory and is triggered by CM0+ after the normal Flash Boot operations.

For more details on Bank switching, see [AN220242 - Flash Rewriting Procedure for Traveo II Family](#).

Also, note that the bits MAIN_BANK_MODE and MAIN_MAP must not be modified by any code executed from the Code Flash or SFlash as this involves sudden changes in the Flash geometry. In the implementation described in this application note, Dual Bank Manager copies a code from SFlash to SRAM, and this code which is executed out of SRAM configures these bits.

Introduction to Secure Boot

4 Introduction to Secure Boot

This section introduces Traveo II MCU's boot sequence. For a detailed description of Traveo II MCU's security features, different lifecycle stages, and implementation of secure boot sequence, see [AN228680 - Secure System Configuration in Traveo II Family](#).

Traveo II MCU's boot sequence ([Figure 3](#)) is based on the ROM boot code and flash boot code implemented for different lifecycle stages. [Figure 3](#) shows how the CM0+ operation starts from reset. After reset, CM0+ starts executing from ROM boot. ROM boot validates SFlash. After validation of SFlash is complete, execution jumps to flash boot and configures the DAP as needed by the protection state. Notice the color coding that depicts the memory type where data and code reside.




Figure 3 Traveo II Boot Sequence

The flash boot then validates the first application listed in TOC2 and jumps to its entry point, if validated. This image is the secure image. If the secure image is found to be invalid or corrupted, the CPU will jump to an idle loop and stay in the idle loop until the device is reset.

4.1 Secure Boot Mechanism for Secure FOTA

The Secure FOTA architecture and sample codes proposed with this application note uses a slightly different mechanism for the secure boot process. The proposed architecture and software assume that you transition the Traveo II device lifecycle stage to Secure or Secure with Debug after the following updates are done:

- User SFlash rows (Row 4 to Row 7) are programmed with the Dual Bank Manager code. For more details on SFlash rows, see the Traveo II MCU Programming Specifications document.

Introduction to Secure Boot

- Public key is programmed to the SFlash Rows (Row 45 to Row 50).
- TOC2 is programmed to SFlash Row 62.

Note that when Traveo II device transitions to secure lifecycle stage, the SFlash rows can no longer be programmed. Also, the transition to secure lifecycle stage will compute the Secure Hash and blow the associated E-Fuse bits.

4.1.1 Dual Bank Manager

This application note majorly focusses on the development of a Dual Bank Manager code, which helps in validating the CM0+ application image and accordingly updates the Flash Bank and Remap registers to execute code from the correct Flash Bank. For software details and complete implementation of this Dual Bank Manager, see [Dual Bank Manager](#). Note that this Dual Bank Manager code is implemented in the User SFlash rows as part of SFlash (SFlash Row 4 to SFlash Row 7).

Dual Bank Manager is developed according to the Cypress Secure Application Format (CySAF), but with no added digital signatures or space restricted for digital signatures. This provides additional advantage of storing any other user-specific data in the available SFlash user rows. This Dual Bank Manager code is then added as an additional object in TOC2 and will be authenticated by the ROM boot. To know more about the TOC2 structure, see section [8.6](#).

4.1.2 ROM Boot Functions for FOTA

When Traveo II device is in the Secure Lifecycle stage, the ROM boot also validates the contents of TOC2 against the SECURE_HASH in E-Fuse. Since the Dual Bank Manager code is added as an additional object in the TOC2, its authenticity is also automatically validated by the ROM boot code. Since the Dual Bank Manager code is part of SFlash memory, which is no longer programmable beyond Secure Lifecycle stage, the probability of any corruption in the Dual Bank Manager is also minimal. Once the ROM boot has successfully validated all necessary objects, ROM boot code jumps to the Flash Boot Code.

4.1.3 Flash Boot Functions for FOTA

In the proposed architecture in this application note, Application Authentication Control by the Flash Boot is disabled. This means TOC2_FLAGS.APP_AUTH_CTL = 1. Also, the Dual Bank Manager address is provided as the CM0+ First Application Object in TOC2. Hence, the Flash boot code directly jumps to the Dual Bank Manager. There is no risk involved even if the authentication is disabled since the Dual Bank Manager code was already authenticated by the ROM boot.

4.1.4 Dual Bank Manager Functions for FOTA

In the proposed architecture in this application note, CM0+ image is built according to CySAF. This means that there is a digital signature (encrypted using Private Key) associated with this image and associated public keys in the SFlash. The Dual Bank Manager checks the validity of this secure image. It first checks the validity of the latest image, which is updated over FOTA. If the new image is invalid, it checks the validity of the old image. The Dual Bank Manager then updates the Flash bank and Remap registers to set the correct logical bank/mapping, and then jumps to the CM0+ application image. If both images are invalid, the Dual Bank Manager will be in an infinite loop.

4.1.5 CM0+ Application Functions for FOTA

CM0+ image which is now authenticated by the Dual Bank Manager can additionally authenticate the CM4 or CM7 application image. This should be done by the CM0+ application image and is not automatically done by Traveo II Boot code or by the Dual Bank Manager.

Introduction to Secure Boot

4.1.6 Chain of Trust (CoT) for Secure FOTA

Summarizing steps 4.1.2 to 4.1.5, the CoT during the device boot happens in the following order in the SECURE protection state.



Table 1 summarizes the protection mechanism for each component involved in the boot flow in secure FOTA.

Table 1 Components Involved in Secure FOTA

Boot Component	Launched By	Protection Mechanism	Function
ROM Boot	Reset	Inherit (This is fixed by design)	ROM boot authenticates the Flash boot and the Dual Bank Manager code (which is added as an extra object in TOC2) and jumps to Flash boot.
Flash Boot	ROM Boot	SECURE_HASH check which is performed by the ROM Boot	Flash boot triggers the Dual Bank Manager function.
Dual Bank Manager	Flash Boot	SECURE_HASH check which is performed by ROM Boot since this code is added as an additional object in TOC2	Dual Bank Manager validates the new CM0+ image over FOTA and updates the Flash Bank/Mapping registers accordingly. Dual Bank Manager then jumps to the CM0+ image.
CM0+ Image	Dual Bank Manager	Dual Bank Manager checks the digital signature authentication of the CM0+ image using the public keys that are programmed to SFlash	CM0+ image can validate the authenticity of the CM4/CM7 application image and can jump to it if valid.
CM4/CM7 Image	CM0+ Image	CM0+ image checks the digital signature authentication of the CM4/CM7 image using the public keys that are programmed to SFlash.	CM4/CM7 image is the main application image.

4.1.7 Work Flash Marker

Since MAIN_BANK_MODE and MAIN_MAP bits of FLASHC_FLASH_CTL register are volatile, the values on these bits will not be retained across resets. Hence, to update this register in the Dual Bank Manager, the support of some nonvolatile memory is required. Small sector of the Work Flash (128 Bytes) is a suitable memory for this purpose.

In the implementation described in this application note, first small sector of the Work Flash is used. Note that this sector is reserved for FOTA and no other information will be stored in this sector as it will be erased and written after every successful FOTA update. It is recommended to configure a SWPU object to protect this sector from any unintended erase or program. If FOTA is completed in Map A, the first 32 bits of this Work Flash sector is updated to 0xAAAAAAAA (Magic Word) and if FOTA is completed in Map B, it is updated to 0xFFFFFFFF.

Introduction to Secure Boot

There is a probability that the FOTA update might be interrupted during the Work Flash update and the Work Flash sector gets erased. The contents of an erased Work Flash sector are unpredictable. To avoid any ECC errors and associated Bus Faults while reading Work Flash in erased state, the FLASHC_FLASH_CTL.WORK_ERR_SILENT is set in the Dual Bank Manager before reading the Work Flash. Note that this bit will be enabled later in the application.

Note: This Work Flash marker only indicates which Mapping will be applied to MAIN_MAP bit of FLASHC_FLASH_CTL register. The start addresses of the applications (for authentication checks) are stored in SFlash. The addresses are CY_APP_START_ADDR_LB and CY_APP_START_ADDR_UB. See section [8.1](#).

Dual Bank Manager

5 Dual Bank Manager

Figure 4 shows the flowchart for the Dual Bank Manager. For details on [flashmarkers](#), see section **8.4.1**. Note that the Dual Bank Manager must be developed according to CySAF format and placed at the SFlash location 0x17000800. This can be done with the support of necessary linker scripts.




Figure 4 Dual Bank Manager Flow Chart

Dual Bank Manager

5.1 Disabling Interrupts

First, the global interrupts are disabled.

```
; Disable global interrupts
CPSID I
```

5.2 Updating VTOR

The Vector Table Offset Register (VTOR) of CM0+ is updated to the Dual Bank Manager vector table address. Since the interrupts are disabled, this will help in catching any Hard Fault occurrences during the execution of Dual Bank Manager. Other interrupt/exception handlers are fixed to zero in the vector table. See section 8.2 for the vector table.

```
; Update Vector Table Offset Register with address of SFlash vector table
LDR r0, =__sflashvector_table
LDR r1, =VTOR
STR r0, [r1]
DSB
```

5.3 Disabling SRAM ECC Check

The stack region used by the Dual Bank Manager is initialized before any function calls. Since the initialization of this region is done by CM0+ that allows only 32-bit writes, the Traveo II devices with SRAM based on 64-bit ECC will perform a read-modify-write operation. So, the ECC check is temporarily disabled for the SRAM.

```
; CM0+ bus width is 32-bit, but SRAM is built with 64-bit based ECC on Traveo
II parts with CM7 core
; Set CPUSS->RAMx_CTL0.ECC_CHECK_DIS bits to avoid causing unintentional ECC
faults during startup while SRAM ECC has not been initialized yet
; Done for all SRAM macros as the stack/function could be placed any where
based on linker script; this could also be modified only to specific SRAM
macros
#if (defined (tviibh4m) || defined (tviibh8m) || defined (tviic2d6m) ||
defined (tviic2d4m))
    MOVS r4, #1
    LSLs r4, r4, #19
    LDR r1, =CPUSS_RAM0_CTL0
    LDR r2, [r1]
    ORRS r2, r4
    STR r2, [r1]
    LDR r1, =CPUSS_RAM1_CTL0
    LDR r2, [r1]
    ORRS r2, r4
    STR r2, [r1]
    LDR r1, =CPUSS_RAM2_CTL0
```

Dual Bank Manager

```

    LDR    r2, [r1]
    ORRS   r2, r4
    STR    r2, [r1]
#endif

```

5.4 Initializing Stack

The stack memory is initialized to zero. Size of the stack is configured by the `STARTUP_STACK_SIZE_DOUBLE_WORDS` macro (See section 8.1).

```

; Initialize ECC of startup stack
    MOVS   r0, #0 ; clear value
    MOVS   r1, #0 ; clear value
    LDR    r2, flashmarkers+28

startup_stack_ecc_init_loop:
    STM    r2!, {r0, r1}
    CMP    r2, sp
    BNE    startup_stack_ecc_init_loop

```

5.5 Initializing SRAM Function Memory Region and Enabling ECC Check

The Dual Bank Manager function copies necessary code to SRAM for configuring the Flash banks. The copy happens in 32 bit writes, so this region is also initialized to zero for Traveo II devices with SRAM based on 64-bit ECC. ECC check is then enabled again.

```

; For Traveo II devices with 64-bit based ECC SRAM, initialize ECC of the
; region where SRAM function shall be copied later from SFlash
#if (defined (tviibh4m) || defined (tviibh8m) || defined (tviic2d6m) ||
defined (tviic2d4m))

    LDR    r2, flashmarkers
; Subtract 1 from R2 due to Thumb alignment
    SUBS   r2, 1
    LDR    r3, flashmarkers+4

; loop to clear the SRAM
SRAM_function_ecc_init_loop:
    STR    r1, [r2, r0]
    ADDS   r0, #8
    CMP    r0, r3
    BCC    SRAM_function_ecc_init_loop

```

Dual Bank Manager

```
; Clear CPUSS->RAMx_CTL0.ECC_CHECK_DIS bits to enable ECC check/correction;
r4 already has the bit position.
```

```
LDR  r1, =CPUSS_RAM0_CTL0
LDR  r2, [r1]
BICS r2, r4
STR  r2, [r1]
LDR  r1, =CPUSS_RAM1_CTL0
LDR  r2, [r1]
BICS r2, r4
STR  r2, [r1]
LDR  r1, =CPUSS_RAM2_CTL0
LDR  r2, [r1]
BICS r2, r4
STR  r2, [r1]
```

```
#endif
```

5.6 Disabling Work Flash Bus Error

For more details, see [Work Flash Marker](#).

```
; Load the address for FLASHC_FLASH_CTL
LDR  r4, flashmarkers+8

; Set FLASHC_FLASH_CTL.WORK_ERR_SILENT
; Reading the Work Flash in erased state can cause bus fault when
FLASHC_FLASH_CTL.WORK_ERR_SILENT is 0
MOVS r1, #1
LSLS r1, r1, #22
ORRS r0, r1
STR  r0, [r4]
LDR  r0, [r4]
```

5.7 Pseudo Code

The following is the pseudo code for the next steps performed by Dual Bank Manager. Note that the Authentication_Flag in the pseudo code is the AUTHENTICATION_CHECK macro listed in section [8.1](#), and is different from TOC2_FLAGS.APP_AUTH_CTL.

```
if (WorkFlash_Marker == MAGIC_WORD)
{
    if (Authentication_Flag == DISABLE)
    {
```

Dual Bank Manager

```
        set reg
        RAM func (MAP_B)
    }
else
{
    if (UpperImage == VALID)
    {
        set reg
        RAM func (MAP_B)
    }
    else if (LowerImage == VALID)
    {
        clear reg
        RAM func(MAP_A)
    }
    else
        ImageInvalid
}
}
else
{
    if (Authentication_Flag == DISABLE)
    {
        clear reg
        RAM func(MAP_A)
    }
    else
    {
        if (LowerImage == VALID)
        {
            clear reg
            RAM func(MAP_A)
        }
        else if (UpperImage == VALID)
        {
            set reg
            RAM func (MAP_B)
        }
        else
            ImageInvalid
    }
}
```

Dual Bank Manager

```
    }
}
```

5.7.1 Magic Word Check

Read the Work Flash address and check if it has the magic word.

`MagicWordCheck:`

```
; Check if the magic word is present in Work Flash address and branch to
appropriate label
```

```
    LDR    r2, flashmarkers+12    ; Load the address of WorkFlash marker
    LDR    r0, [r2]               ; Load the marker value to r0
    LDR    r1, flashmarkers+16    ; Load the magic word
    LDR    r3, flashmarkers+20    ; Load the flag for authentication check
    LDR    r4, flashmarkers+24    ; Load the AUTHENTICATION_DISABLE for
comparison
    CMP    r0, r1
    BNE    Check_MapA_LB
```

5.7.2 Authentication Check

If the authentication flag is enabled (see [8.4.1](#)), check if the Map A or Map B application has valid digital signature using the `Cy_FB_VerifyApplication` function. For details on the `_checkLB` and `_checkUB` functions, see [Digital Signature Verification Function](#).

`Check_MapB_UB:`

```
; Check if the authentication check is disabled. If disabled directly jump to
Auth_Skip_MapB. If enabled, perform the authentication.
```

```
    CMP    r3, r4
    BEQ    Auth_Skip_MapB
```

```
; Check if the result of authentication of upper bank image is successful, if
not jump to Check_MapB_LB and check lower bank
```

```
    BL     _checkUB
    CMP    r0, #1
    BNE    Check_MapB_LB
```

`Auth_Skip_MapB:`

```
; Jump to the FlashtoRAM_copy function with register r6 set
```

```
    MOVS   r6, #1
    B      FlashtoRAM_copy
```


Dual Bank Manager

Check_MapB_LB:

; Check if the result of authentication of lower bank image is successful, if not jump to ImageInvalid, and no application is launched.

```
BL    _checkLB
CMP   r0, #1
BNE   ImageInvalid
```

; Jump to the FlashtoRAM_copy copy function with register r6 cleared

```
MOVS  r6, #0
B     FlashtoRAM_copy
```

Check_MapA_LB:

; Check if the authentication check is disabled. If disabled directly jump to Auth_Skip_MapA. If enabled, perform the authentication.

```
CMP   r3, r4
BEQ   Auth_Skip_MapA
```

; Check if the result of authentication of lower bank image is successful, if not jump to Check_MapA_UB and check upper bank

```
BL    _checkLB
CMP   r0, #1
BNE   Check_MapA_UB
```

Auth_Skip_MapA:

; Jump to the FlashtoRAM_copy function with register r6 cleared

```
MOVS  r6, #0
B     FlashtoRAM_copy
```

Check_MapA_UB:

; Check if the result of authentication of upper bank image is successful, if not jump to ImageInvalid, no application is launched.

```
BL    _checkUB
CMP   r0, #1
BNE   ImageInvalid
```

; Jump to the FlashtoRAM_copy function with register r6 set

```
MOVS  r6, #1
B     FlashtoRAM_copy
```

Dual Bank Manager

5.7.3 Authentication Failure

If the authentication of the image in one bank fails, Dual Bank Manager checks the image in the alternate bank. If both images are invalid, the Dual Bank Manager enters a dead state in an infinite loop.

```
; Enters this handler when both banks have invalid images
```

```
ImageInvalid:
```

```
    B    ImageInvalid
```

5.7.4 SFlash to SRAM Copy

If a valid image is available in any of the Flash Banks or if the authentication flag is disabled, the `_flashbankswitch` function is copied from SFlash to SRAM and the Dual Bank Manager jumps to this SRAM function.

```
FlashtoRAM_copy:
```

```
; Copy the _flashbankswitch function to SRAM and Dual Bank Manager jumps to  
SRAM where the dual bank configuration is done
```

```
; Load the register with the source address, destination address and size
```

```
    ADR   r3, _flashbankswitch  
    LDR   r2, flashmarkers  
    LDR   r1, flashmarkers+4
```

```
; Subtract 1 from R2 due to Thumb alignment
```

```
    SUBS  r2, #1
```

```
; R0 is used for compare operation
```

```
    MOVS  r0, #0  
    B     compare
```

```
; loop to copy the complete SFlash function to SRAM
```

```
copyloop:
```

```
    LDR   r4, [r3,r0]  
    STR   r4, [r2,r0]  
    ADDS  r0, #4
```

```
compare:
```

```
    CMP   r0, r1  
    BCC   copyloop
```

```
; Jump to the _flashbankswitch copy function in SRAM with valid r6
```

Dual Bank Manager

```
LDR  r7, flashmarkers
BX   r7
```

5.8 Digital Signature Verification Function

The Dual Bank Manager uses the [LowerBankCheck](#) and [UpperBankCheck](#) functions to check the authentication of the Code Flash application. Following is the code for [LowerBankCheck](#).

```
; Performs authentication of the lower Bank
```

```
LowerBankCheck:
```

```
.align 4
```

```
_checkLB:
```

```
PUSH {LR}
```

```
; Check if the Application is valid with Cy_FB_VerifyApplication()
```

```
; Load the registers with the lower bank parameters for
Cy_FB_VerifyApplication() function
```

```
LDR  r0, addrmarker+4      ; address of the lower bank image
LDR  r1, [r0]              ; length of the lower bank image
ADDS r2, r0, r1            ; address of the digital signature
BCS  skip_LB_check        ; carry bit detected, boundary violation
LDR  r4, addrmarker+16     ; end address for the lower bank
CMP  r2, r4                ; boundary condition check
BHI  skip_LB_check        ; skip Cy_FB_VerifyApplication
LDR  r3, addrmarker+8     ; address of the public key
```

```
; Get the address of Cy_FB_VerifyApplication() from SFlash marker
```

```
LDR  r4, addrmarker
LDR  r7, [r4]
```

```
; Call Cy_FB_VerifyApplication() function
```

```
BLX  r7
```

```
skip_LB_check:
```

```
POP  {PC}
```

```
.endif _checkLB
```

```
; Performs authentication of the upper Bank
```

```
UpperBankCheck:
```

Dual Bank Manager

```
.align 4

_checkUB:

    PUSH {LR}

; Check if the Application is valid with Cy_FB_VerifyApplication()

; Load the registers with the upper bank parameters for
Cy_FB_VerifyApplication() function
    LDR r0, addrmarker+12      ; address of the upper bank image
    LDR r1, [r0]               ; length of the upper bank image
    ADDS r2, r0, r1            ; address of the digital signature
    BCS skip_UB_check         ; carry bit detected, boundary violation
    LDR r4, addrmarker+20      ; end address for the upper bank
    CMP r2, r4                 ; boundary condition check
    BHI skip_UB_check         ; skip Cy_FB_VerifyApplication
    LDR r3, addrmarker+8       ; address of the public key

; Get the address of Cy_FB_VerifyApplication() from SFlash marker
    LDR r4, addrmarker
    LDR r7, [r4]

; Call Cy_FB_VerifyApplication() function
    BLX r7

skip_UB_check:
    POP {PC}

    .endif _checkUB
```

Note that [UpperBankCheck](#) also uses a similar concept for the Upper bank. This function internally uses the `Cy_FB_VerifyApplication` function present in SFlash. The parameters of this function are checked and then loaded to registers r0-r3. The address of the function is loaded to register r4 and then a jump is performed using BLX. The boundary conditions for Code Flash memory is also checked within a bank before `Cy_FB_VerifyApplication` is called. If the boundary conditions are violated, then `Cy_FB_VerifyApplication` is not called and authentication fails. If the digital signature of the Code Flash application is valid, register r0 will be set to 1; else it will be 0. For details on [addrmarker](#), see section [8.4.2](#).

SRAM Function for Flash Bank Management

6 SRAM Function for Flash Bank Management

As mentioned in [Bank Switching Mechanism in Traveo II](#), the flash bank management operation is executed out of SRAM memory. This is the copy of the `_flashbankswitch` function available in SFlash. [Figure 5](#) shows the implementation of this function. For details on `ramdatamarker`, see section [8.4.3](#).




Figure 5 SRAM Function Flow Chart

6.1 Configure Flash as Dual Bank

Set the `FLASHC_FLASH_CTL.MAIN_BANK_MODE` bit to configure dual bank mode.

```
; Load the address for FLASHC_FLASH_CTL
```

```
LDR r4, ramdatamarker
```

```
; Set FLASHC_FLASH_CTL.MAIN_BANK_MODE for dual bank mode
```

```
LDR r0, [r4]
```

```
MOVS r1, #1
```

```
LSLS r1, r1, #12
```

```
ORRS r0, r1
```

```
STR r0, [r4]
```

```
LDR r0, [r4]
```

SRAM Function for Flash Bank Management

6.2 Configure Flash Map

Based on the Magic word and authentication check done earlier, configure FLASHC_FLASH_CTL.MAIN_MAP to operate in Map A or Map B.

```
; Set '1' for bit corresponding to FLASHC_FLASH_CTL.MAIN_MAP in register R1
    MOVS r1, #1
    ADDS r1, #255

; Check if register R6 is set
    CMP  r6, #1
    BNE  MapA

; Map B is valid, set the bit corresponding to FLASHC_FLASH_CTL.MAIN_MAP
MapB:
    ORRS r0, r1
    B     common

; Map A is valid, clear the bit corresponding to FLASHC_FLASH_CTL.MAIN_MAP
MapA:
    BICS r0, r1

common:

; configure FLASHC_FLASH_CTL.MAIN_MAP
    STR  r0, [r4]

; read back FLASHC_FLASH_CTL
    LDR  r0, [r4]
```

6.3 Memory Barrier Operations and Cache Invalidation

Issue a memory barrier instruction and then invalidate the cache and buffer.

```
; instruction barrier operation
    ISB  SY

; invalidate cache and buffers
    LDR  r0, [r4,8]
    MOVS r1, #1
    ORRS r0, r1
    STR  r0, [r4,8]
```

SRAM Function for Flash Bank Management

```
; wait till cache and buffers are invalidated
```

```
cache_clearloop:
```

```
    LDR    r0, [r4,8]
```

```
    LSLS  r0, r0, #31
```

```
    BMI   cache_clearloop
```

6.4 Branch to CM0+ Application

Branch to the reset handler of the Code Flash application identified using CySAF format and jump to it.

```
; jump to the _startcontd function which is the reset handler of the CM0+ application placed at 0x10000000 based on CySAF
```

```
    LDR    r5, ramdatamarker+4           ; Load the starting address of CySAF
```

```
    LDR    r1, [r5,16]
```

```
    ADDS  r1, #16
```

```
    ADDS  r5, r1
```

```
    LDR    r7, [r5,4]
```

```
    BX     r7
```

```
.endif _flashbankswitch
```

Summary

7 Summary

This application note explained the different steps involved in the design of secure FOTA update. Note that the focus was on launching the CM0+ application securely after a FOTA update. This CM0+ application can additionally authenticate the host application which is based on CM4 or CM7.

Appendix - Dual Bank Manager: Dependencies

8 Appendix - Dual Bank Manager: Dependencies

This section describes the additional dependencies involved in the development of a project involving secure FOTA. It also describes the necessary constants, macros, vector table configurations, and so on, which are typically used by the Dual Bank Manager.

8.1 Constants

```
STARTUP_STACK_SIZE_DOUBLE_WORDS      .equ 128

VTOR                                  .equ 0xe00ed08
CPUSS_RAM0_CTL0                       .equ 0x40201300
CPUSS_RAM1_CTL0                       .equ 0x40201380
CPUSS_RAM2_CTL0                       .equ 0x402013a0

; Macros used for flash configurations
MAGIC_WORD                           .equ 0xAAAAAAAA
ADDR_MAKER_ON_WORK                   .equ 0x14012000
FLASHC_FLASH_CTL                     .equ 0x40240000

; Macros used for application authentication

CY_FB_VERIFYAPP_ADDR                 .equ 0x17002040
CY_PUBLIC_KEY_ADDR                   .equ 0x17006408
CY_APP_START_ADDR_LB                 .equ 0x10000000

; Macro to enable application authentication by Dual Bank Manager
AUTHENTICATION_ENABLE                 .equ 0x00000001

; Macro to disable application authentication by Dual Bank Manager
AUTHENTICATION_DISABLE                .equ 0x55555555

; The following macros should be set by user based on the device and
requirement

; Set AUTHENTICATION_CHECK to AUTHENTICATION_ENABLE or AUTHENTICATION_DISABLE
AUTHENTICATION_CHECK                  .equ AUTHENTICATION_ENABLE

; Mid-Point of the Large sectors in single bank mode for Traveo II 1M device.
This value shall be modified based on the Target Device. Application intended
to be executed out of Map B shall be placed at this starting address.
```

Appendix - Dual Bank Manager: Dependencies

```
CY_APP_START_ADDR_UB                .equ 0x10078000
```

; Macro used for the flash boundary check. This macro has the value (Map A/B Large sector end address in single bank mode - size of the digital signature (256 bytes)) for Traveo II 1M device. These values shall be modified based on the Target Device

```
CY_APP_END_ADDR_LB                .equ 0x10077F00        ; 0x10078000 -
0x100
```

```
CY_APP_END_ADDR_UB                .equ 0x100EFF00        ; 0x100F0000 -
0x100
```

; For CYT2B78CAE the user reset handler is _startcontd which is continuation of the SFlash _start

```
User_Reset_Handler                .equ _startcontd
```

8.2 Dual Bank Manager Vector Table

; This is the vector table required for CySAF of the Dual Bank Manager. Only the first 4 entries are used, others are filled with zero.

```
.section ".sflashintvec", "a"
; align to 256 bytes, because CM0_VECTOR_TABLE_BASE register only
supports address bits [31:8]
.align 256
```

```
__sflashvector_table:
```

```
DCD    __ghsend_stack
DCD    _start
DCD    Exception_handler
DCD    Exception_handler
DCD    0
DCD    0
DCD    0
```

```
__sflashvector_table_0x1c:
```

```
DCD    0
DCD    0
DCD    0
DCD    0
DCD    0
DCD    0
DCD    0
```

Appendix - Dual Bank Manager: Dependencies

```
DCD      0
DCD      0
```

```
; External interrupts      PowerMode      Description

DCD      0                  ; DeepSleep    CPU User Interrupt #0
DCD      0                  ; DeepSleep    CPU User Interrupt #1
DCD      0                  ; DeepSleep    CPU User Interrupt #2
DCD      0                  ; DeepSleep    CPU User Interrupt #3
DCD      0                  ; DeepSleep    CPU User Interrupt #4
DCD      0                  ; DeepSleep    CPU User Interrupt #5
DCD      0                  ; DeepSleep    CPU User Interrupt #6
DCD      0                  ; DeepSleep    CPU User Interrupt #7

; These IRQs can only be triggered by SW via NVIC regs
DCD      0                  ; Active      CPU User Interrupt #8
DCD      0                  ; Active      CPU User Interrupt #9
DCD      0                  ; Active      CPU User Interrupt #10
DCD      0                  ; Active      CPU User Interrupt #11
DCD      0                  ; Active      CPU User Interrupt #12
DCD      0                  ; Active      CPU User Interrupt #13
DCD      0                  ; Active      CPU User Interrupt #14
DCD      0                  ; Active      CPU User Interrupt #15

.endo __sflashvector_table
```

8.3 SRAM Function Space Reservation

```
; SRAM section to reserve space for SRAM function needed for flash bank
configurations
.section ".ramprog", "awx"
.align 8

; number of bytes for to allocated in ramprog for _flashbankswitchramcopy
_flashbankswitchsize      .equ (_flashbankswitchend - _flashbankswitch)

_flashbankswitchramcopy:
    .space      _flashbankswitchsize
#endif
```

Appendix - Dual Bank Manager: Dependencies

8.4 Macros

8.4.1 flashmarkers

; Markers for flash copy operation

.align 4

flashmarkers:

```
DCD    _flashbankswitchramcopy      ; flashmarkers
DCD    _flashbankswitchsize         ; flashmarkers+4
DCD    FLASHC_FLASH_CTL             ; flashmarkers+8
DCD    ADDR_MAKER_ON_WORK           ; flashmarkers+12
DCD    MAGIC_WORD                   ; flashmarkers+16
DCD    AUTHENTICATION_CHECK         ; flashmarkers+20
DCD    AUTHENTICATION_DISABLE       ; flashmarkers+24
DCD    (__ghsend_stack - (#STARTUP_STACK_SIZE_DOUBLE_WORDS * 8));
```

flashmarkers+28

.endo flashmarkers

8.4.2 addrmarker

; Markers used by the LowerBankCheck and UpperBankCheck functions

.align 4

addrmarker:

```
DCD    CY_FB_VERIFYAPP_ADDR         ; addrmarker
DCD    CY_APP_START_ADDR_LB         ; addrmarker+4
DCD    CY_PUBLIC_KEY_ADDR           ; addrmarker+8
DCD    CY_APP_START_ADDR_UB         ; addrmarker+12
DCD    CY_APP_END_ADDR_LB           ; addrmarker+16
DCD    CY_APP_END_ADDR_UB           ; addrmarker+20
```

.endo addrmarker

8.4.3 ramdatamarker

; Markers used by the RAM function

.align 4

ramdatamarker:

```
DCD    FLASHC_FLASH_CTL             ; ramdatamarker
DCD    CY_APP_START_ADDR_LB         ; ramdatamarker+4
```

.endo ramdatamarker

Appendix - Dual Bank Manager: Dependencies

8.5 CySAF

When the Traveo II device is in SECURE protection state, Flash boot can launch an application based on CySAF format only. For details on the format used by CySAF, see the Application Formats section of the [Architecture TRM](#).

The Dual Bank Manager launched by Flash Boot will be based on CySAF format.

8.6 TOC2 Details

ROM Boot and Flash Boot uses the contents present in TOC2 for various operations. [Table 2](#) shows the modifications done to TOC2 as part of secure FOTA.

Table 2 TOC2 for Secure FOTA

Offset	Purpose	Default Value	Modified Value	Comments
0x00	Object size in bytes for CRC calculation starting from offset 0x00	0x00001FC		
0x04	Magic number (Fixed: 0x01211220)	0x01211220		
0x08	Null-terminated table of pointers representing the SMIF configuration structure	0x00000000		
0x0C	Address of First User Application Object	0x10000000	0x17000800	Dual Bank Manager which is launched by Flash Boot
0x10	Format of First User Application Object. 0: Basic, 1: Cypress standard, 2: Simplified	0x00000000	0x1	CySAF format has to be used in SECURE protection state
0x14	Address of Second User Application Object Second user application is validated if the first application validation failed	0x00000000		
0x18	Format of Second User Application Object. 0: Basic, 1: Cypress standard, 2: Simplified	0x00000000		
0x1C	Address of First CM4 or CM7 core1 User Application Object	0x00000000		
0x20	Address of Second CM4 or CM7 core1 User Application Object	0x00000000		
0x24	Address of First CM4 or CM7 core2 User Application Object	0x00000000		
0x28	Address of Second CM4 or CM7 core2 User Application Object	0x00000000		
0x100	Number of additional objects to be verified for SECURE_HASH	0x00000003	4	Dual Bank Manager is added as an additional object

Appendix - Dual Bank Manager: Dependencies

Offset	Purpose	Default Value	Modified Value	Comments																								
0x104	Address of signature verification key (0 if none). The object is signature specific key. It is the public key in case of RSA.	0x00000000	0x17006400	Address where the public key which is used for signature authentication (this is not used when APP_AUTH_CTL is disabled) is available																								
0x108	Address of Application Protection	0x17007600		This area shall not be modified																								
0x10C	Reserved	0x00000000		This area shall not be modified																								
0x110	Additional object	0x00000000	0x17000800	Dual Bank Manager																								
0x114-0x1F0	Additional objects if needed, or 0s if none	0x00000000																										
0x1F4	TOC2 REVISION	-																										
0x1F8	Controls default configuration Bits [1:0]: CLOCK_CONFIG Flag to indicate clock frequency configuration. The clock should stay the same after flash boot execution. <table><tr><th>Value [1:0]</th><th>Description</th></tr><tr><td>0x0</td><td>8 MHz, IMO, no FLL</td></tr><tr><td>0x1</td><td>25 MHz, IMO + FLL</td></tr><tr><td>0x2</td><td>50MHz, IMO + FLL (Default)</td></tr><tr><td>0x3</td><td>Use ROM boot clocks configuration (100 MHz)</td></tr></table> Bits [4:2]: LISTEN_WINDOW Flag to determine the Listen window to allow sufficient time to acquire debug port. <table><tr><th>Value [4:2]</th><th>Description</th></tr><tr><td>0x0</td><td>20 ms (Default)</td></tr><tr><td>0x1</td><td>10 ms</td></tr><tr><td>0x2</td><td>1 ms</td></tr><tr><td>0x3</td><td>0 ms (No Listen window)</td></tr><tr><td>0x4</td><td>100 ms</td></tr><tr><td>Others</td><td>Reserved</td></tr></table> Bits [6:5]: SWJ_PINS_CTL	Value [1:0]	Description	0x0	8 MHz, IMO, no FLL	0x1	25 MHz, IMO + FLL	0x2	50MHz, IMO + FLL (Default)	0x3	Use ROM boot clocks configuration (100 MHz)	Value [4:2]	Description	0x0	20 ms (Default)	0x1	10 ms	0x2	1 ms	0x3	0 ms (No Listen window)	0x4	100 ms	Others	Reserved	0x00000242	0x000002C2	Authentication by Flash Boot is disabled (bits [8:7] is 0x1)
Value [1:0]	Description																											
0x0	8 MHz, IMO, no FLL																											
0x1	25 MHz, IMO + FLL																											
0x2	50MHz, IMO + FLL (Default)																											
0x3	Use ROM boot clocks configuration (100 MHz)																											
Value [4:2]	Description																											
0x0	20 ms (Default)																											
0x1	10 ms																											
0x2	1 ms																											
0x3	0 ms (No Listen window)																											
0x4	100 ms																											
Others	Reserved																											

Appendix - Dual Bank Manager: Dependencies

Offset	Purpose	Default Value	Modified Value	Comments																														
	<p>Flag to determine if SWJ pins are configured in SWJ mode by flash boot. Note: SWJ pins may be enabled later in the user code.</p> <table><tr><th>Value [6:5]</th><th>Description</th></tr><tr><td>0x0</td><td>Do not enable SWJ pins in Flash boot. Listen window is skipped.</td></tr><tr><td>0x1</td><td>Do not enable SWJ pins in Flash boot. Listen window is skipped.</td></tr><tr><td>0x2</td><td>Enable SWJ pins in Flash boot (default)</td></tr><tr><td>0x3</td><td>Do not enable SWJ pins in Flash boot. Listen window is skipped.</td></tr></table> <p>Bits [8:7]: APP_AUTH_CTL Flag to determine if the application image digital signature verification (authentication) is performed:</p> <table><tr><th>Value [8:7]</th><th>Description</th></tr><tr><td>0x0</td><td>Authentication is enabled (default).</td></tr><tr><td>0x1</td><td>Authentication is disabled.</td></tr><tr><td>0x2</td><td>Authentication is enabled (recommended).</td></tr><tr><td>0x3</td><td>Authentication is enabled.</td></tr></table> <p>Bits [10:9]: FB_BOOTLOADER_CTL Flag to determine if the internal bootloader in flash boot is disabled:</p> <table><tr><th>Value [9]</th><th>Description</th></tr><tr><td>0x0</td><td>Internal bootloader is disabled.</td></tr><tr><td>0x1</td><td>Internal bootloader is launched if other bootloader conditions are met (default).</td></tr><tr><td>0x2</td><td>Internal bootloader is disabled.</td></tr><tr><td>0x3</td><td>Internal bootloader is disabled.</td></tr></table>	Value [6:5]	Description	0x0	Do not enable SWJ pins in Flash boot. Listen window is skipped.	0x1	Do not enable SWJ pins in Flash boot. Listen window is skipped.	0x2	Enable SWJ pins in Flash boot (default)	0x3	Do not enable SWJ pins in Flash boot. Listen window is skipped.	Value [8:7]	Description	0x0	Authentication is enabled (default).	0x1	Authentication is disabled.	0x2	Authentication is enabled (recommended).	0x3	Authentication is enabled.	Value [9]	Description	0x0	Internal bootloader is disabled.	0x1	Internal bootloader is launched if other bootloader conditions are met (default).	0x2	Internal bootloader is disabled.	0x3	Internal bootloader is disabled.			
Value [6:5]	Description																																	
0x0	Do not enable SWJ pins in Flash boot. Listen window is skipped.																																	
0x1	Do not enable SWJ pins in Flash boot. Listen window is skipped.																																	
0x2	Enable SWJ pins in Flash boot (default)																																	
0x3	Do not enable SWJ pins in Flash boot. Listen window is skipped.																																	
Value [8:7]	Description																																	
0x0	Authentication is enabled (default).																																	
0x1	Authentication is disabled.																																	
0x2	Authentication is enabled (recommended).																																	
0x3	Authentication is enabled.																																	
Value [9]	Description																																	
0x0	Internal bootloader is disabled.																																	
0x1	Internal bootloader is launched if other bootloader conditions are met (default).																																	
0x2	Internal bootloader is disabled.																																	
0x3	Internal bootloader is disabled.																																	

8.7 Transition to Secure

Traveo II devices are shipped to customers in NORMAL_PROVISIONED lifecycle state. Transition to Secure system call is used to transition to SECURE lifecycle state. Note that the SFlash memory must be correctly programmed before transitioning to SECURE state since SFlash writes are not allowed after transitioning to SECURE.

Appendix - Dual Bank Manager: Dependencies

For more details, see the Transition to Secure section of the [Architecture TRM](#). During the transition to secure lifecycle stage, the SECURE_HASH will be calculated for all necessary objects including the Dual Bank Manager as it is added as an additional object in TOC2.

8.8 Required Tools

Following are some tools that might be required to support various operations:

- OpenSSL
- Cypress Auto Flash Utility 1.0
- cymcuelftool
- Python 3

For example, Cypress Auto Flash Utility 1.0 supports SFlash programming. It can be used for programming Dual Bank Manager and TOC2. OpenSSL can be used for generating Private and Public keys, while cymcuelftool supports generation of digital signature for an application. Note that these tools are only for demonstration purposes and may not be used for production designs.

For more details on these tools, see [AN228680 - Secure System Configuration in Traveo II Family](#).

Glossary

Glossary

Terms	Description
CPU	Central Processing Unit
NVIC	Nested vectored interrupt controller
NMI	Non-maskable interrupt
IRQ	Interrupt request
FOTA	Firmware Over The Air
OTA	Over The Air
SWPU	Software Protection Unit
ECC	Error Correction Code
ROM	Read Only Memory
SFlash	Supervisory Flash
SRAM	Static Random-Access Memory
TOC	Table Of Contents
CySAF	Cypress Secure Application Format

Related Documents

Related Documents

The following are the Traveo II family series datasheets and Technical Reference Manuals. Contact [Technical Support](#) to obtain these documents.

[1] Device datasheet

- CYT2B7 Datasheet 32-Bit Arm® Cortex®-M4F Microcontroller Traveo™ II Family
- CYT2B9 Datasheet 32-Bit Arm® Cortex®-M4F Microcontroller Traveo™ II Family
- CYT4BF Datasheet 32-Bit Arm® Cortex®-M7 Microcontroller Traveo™ II Family
- CYT4DN Datasheet 32-Bit Arm® Cortex®-M7 Microcontroller Traveo™ II Family
- CYT3BB/4BB Datasheet 32-Bit Arm® Cortex®-M7 Microcontroller Traveo™ II Family

[2] Body Controller Entry Family

- Traveo™ II Automotive Body Controller Entry Family Architecture Technical Reference Manual (TRM)
- Traveo™ II Automotive Body Controller Entry Registers Technical Reference Manual (TRM) for CYT2B7
- Traveo™ II Automotive Body Controller Entry Registers Technical Reference Manual (TRM) for CYT2B9

[3] Body Controller High Family

- Traveo™ II Automotive Body Controller High Family Architecture Technical Reference Manual (TRM)
- Traveo™ II Automotive Body Controller High Registers Technical Reference Manual (TRM) for CYT4BF
- Traveo™ II Automotive Body Controller High Registers Technical Reference Manual (TRM) for CYT3BB/4BB

[4] Cluster 2D Family

- Traveo™ II Automotive Cluster 2D Family Architecture Technical Reference Manual (TRM)
- Traveo™ II Automotive Cluster 2D Registers Technical Reference Manual (TRM)

[5] Application Notes

- AN228680 - Secure System Configuration in Traveo™ II Family
- AN220242 - Flash Rewriting Procedure for Traveo™ II Family

Revision history

Revision history

Document version	Date of release	Description of changes
**	2020-06-03	New Application Note.
*A	2021-02-24	Migrated to Infineon template

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