# HSM Hardware Security Module

AURIX<sup>™</sup> TC2xx Microcontroller Training V1.1 2019-03



Please read the Important Notice and Warnings at the end of this document

## HSM Hardware Security Module





#### Highlights

- > 32 bit ARM Cortex M3 processor with up to 100 MHz CPU speed.
- > MPU (Memory Protection Unit)
- > True Random Number Generator

| Key Features  | Customer Benefits  |
|---|--|
| AES128 and TRNG implemented in HW   | <ul> <li>AES-128 Hardware Accelerator for<br/>symmetric cryptography</li> </ul>                        |
| AES CMAC with minimum rate 25 MBytes/s  | <ul> <li>Protection against logical attacks, debugger<br/>protection</li> </ul>                        |
| Secure Key Storage in separate HSM P/DFlash portion (8 x 8 KB DF1 only in HE) | <ul> <li>Secured boot and communication, Tuning<br/>protection, Authentication, Immobilizer</li> </ul> |

## HSM AES128 and TRNG implemented in HW



- The AES module is a fast hardware device that supports encryption and decryption via a 128-bit key AES (Advanced Encryption System)
- It enables plain/simple encryption and decryption of a single 128-bit data (i.e., plain text or cipher text) block as well as encryption or decryption of a multitude of data blocks of 128 bits each. For these, several so called modes of operation are implemented
  - ECB (electronic code book mode)
  - CBC (cipher block chaining mode)
  - CTR (32-bit counter mode)
  - OFB (output feedback mode)
  - CFB (cipher feedback mode)
- > This enables also the additional modes
  - GCM (Galois counter mode)
  - XTS (XEX-based Tweaked Code Book mode (TCB) with Cipher Text Stealing (CTS))
- > TRNG generates Random Numbers:
  - Keys for cryptographic algorithm
  - Support Protocols (Challenges, blinding values, padding bytes, etc.)
  - Fully compliant to the AIS 20/31 standard

## HSM AES CMAC with minimum rate 25 MBytes/s



- CMAC (Cipher-based Message Authentication Code) is widely used for authentication
- > It is based on symmetrical encryption like the CBC-MAC algorithm
- > Secured boot uses the CMAC for tampering detection
- > A fast calculation of a CMAC is desired to speed up the boot process time



### HSM Secure key storage in separate HSM P/DFlash portion



- Secured key storage, secured data and counters can be saved in a dedicated Data Flash area
- 8 x 8 KB = 64 KB of DFlash (DF1) reserved for HSM (only in AURIX™ TC27x/TC29x devices)
- > Data Flash content is refreshed in Round Robin via FEE drivers
- The segregation of the sensible information inside the HSM Data Flash can be enforced using the feature "exclusive access", which allows the read and write access only to the HSM core
- A dedicated HSM Data Flash allows that the execution of the TriCore™ application can fetch and read code or data from Program Flash while updating secured non-volatile information

### HSM System integration



- > HSM is connected with the device via the SPB (System Peripheral bus)
- The Bridge module acts as a "firewall" so the HSM internal resources are protected from accesses by other masters
- P/DFlash of the HSM are shared with the device, but can be protected via an "exclusive access" from TriCore<sup>™</sup> and other masters accesses
- > HSM, as a system on chip, is a bus master on the SPB



### Application example Chip tuning protection





#### **Overview**

- > Challenge Response Authentication
- > Closed Debugger Interface
- > IP Protection
- > Tuning Protection

#### **Advantages**

- Memory protection plus the option to close the debug interfaces protects against unauthorized read and write access
- An exchange of the micro can be prevented by means of challengeresponse authentication



#### **Revision history**

| Revision | Description of change                                   |
|----------|---|
| V1.0     | Initial version   |
| V1.1     | Update of highlights and AES CMAC, spelling corrections |
|          |   |
|          |   |

#### Trademarks

All referenced product or service names and trademarks are the property of their respective owners.



Edition 2019-03 Published by Infineon Technologies AG 81726 Munich, Germany

© 2019 Infineon Technologies AG. All Rights Reserved.

Do you have a question about this document? Email: <u>erratum@infineon.com</u>

Document reference AURIX\_Training\_1\_ Hardware\_Security\_Module

#### **IMPORTANT NOTICE**

The information given in this document shall in no event be regarded as a guarantee of conditions or characteristics ("Beschaffenheitsgarantie").

With respect to any examples, hints or any typical values stated herein and/or any information regarding the application of the product, Infineon Technologies hereby disclaims any and all warranties and liabilities of any kind, including without limitation warranties of non-infringement of intellectual property rights of any third party.

In addition, any information given in this document is subject to customer's compliance with its obligations stated in this document and any applicable legal requirements, norms and standards concerning customer's products and any use of the product of Infineon Technologies in customer's applications.

The data contained in this document is exclusively intended for technically trained staff. It is the responsibility of customer's technical departments to evaluate the suitability of the product for the intended application and the completeness of the product information given in this document with respect to such application. For further information on the product, technology, delivery terms and conditions and prices please contact your nearest Infineon Technologies office (www.infineon.com).

#### WARNINGS

Due to technical requirements products may contain dangerous substances. For information on the types in question please contact your nearest Infineon Technologies office.

Except as otherwise explicitly approved by Infineon Technologies in a written document signed by authorized representatives of Infineon Technologies, Infineon Technologies' products may not be used in any applications where a failure of the product or any consequences of the use thereof can reasonably be expected to result in personal injury.